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SOUTH KOREAN POLITICS IN TRANSITION: 
DEMOCRATIZATION, ELECTIONS, AND THE VOTERS* 
The restoration of direct presidential elections in 1987 provided 
momentum for democratization in South Korea. Indeed, popular election 
of the president had become a symbol of democratization since President 
Park Chung-bee abolished it in 1972. It may be still a matter for debate 
whether South Korea is a fully democratized country, but since the 
democratic 'founding' election of 1987, it has held free and competitive 
elections five times nationwide (a second presidential election in 1992, 
three more National Assembly elections in 1988, 1992 and 1996, and an 
election in 1995 for local government bodies) and the electoral process 
has begun to occupy a central place in South Korean politics. This paper 
focuses on the meaning of elections in South Korea during the 
democratization period ( 1985-92). It begins by briefly reviewing the 
political process from 1945 to 1987, with particular attention to South 
Korea's democratic experiments, and then discusses how the old and new 
cleavages-that is, the cleavages of government versus opposition, and of 
regionalism-have shaped electoral choice in elections during the 
democratization period. The paper also discusses the role played by 
regional cleavages, which have continued to prevail in electoral contests 
since 1987, within the current presidential system of government in 
South Korea. 
Democratic experiments in South Korea 1948-85 
More than four decades have passed since the first government of South 
Korea was created by a popular election in 1948. As in several other 
newborn nations of that period, 1 the introduction of democratic 
institutions after the Second World War gave ordinary Koreans the right 
to choose who would run the country.2 Until recently, however, 
democratic 'experiments' in Korea have failed to sustain a workable 
democratic system. 3 
The first democratic experiment under the Rhee Syngman 
government ( 1948-60) ended in failure, marred by election rigging, 
irregular constitutional changes, and repression of the opposition. The 
Rhee government became increasingly dictatorial, using police and the 
bureaucratic apparatus to enforce its power until it was toppled by 
student uprisings in April 1960, prompted by massive election fraud in 
March. The second experiment, by the Chang Myon government ( 1960-
61 ), adopted a parliamentary system under Democratic Party leadership. 
But it too failed only nine months after its inauguration, as a result of the 
military coup led by Major General Park Chung-bee in May 1961 (Kim 
1974; Han 1974). The military junta that came to power after the coup 
eventually transformed itself into a political machine, seeking popular 
support and legitimacy by means of competitive elections. From 1963 to 
1972 (the period before adoption of the Yushin Constitution that 
abolished popular elections for the presidency and strengthened 
presidential power),4 Park Chung-bee and his Democratic Republican 
Party succeeded in securing three consecutive terms in office. This was 
achieved through competitive elections, albeit making use of the so­
called 'yodang [party in power] premium', which included such 
methods as mobilizing administrative networks and monopolizing 
absentee votes (mainly from the army) . The latter years of rule under 
Park ( 1972-79) deteriorated into 'Korean-style democracy', a 
euphemism for authoritarian government under the Yushin system, and 
ended with the violent death of Park at the hands of his chief intelligence 
aide. 
The collapse of the Park regime seemed to offer a renewed chance 
for restoring democracy, but it eventually confirmed the observation 
made by Pastor in the Latin American context: 
People then were mistaken in equating the fall of tyrants with the rise of 
democracy. They were separate events, and the second did not always 
follow from the first (Pastor 1989:6). 
The new military junta led by Major General Chun Doo-hwan staged 
a 'coup-like incident' in December 1979 in the course of investigation 
of Park's assassination. Chun briskly ascended to the presidency in 
August 1980 through the rubber-stamp electoral college set up under the 
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Yushin system. He purged all the established politicians, banned all 
political parties, forced the dismissal of the interim government under 
then President Choi Kyu-hah (who had reaffirmed a new constitution and 
a fair general election), and violently suppressed civil unrest, which was 
heightened by the Kwangju massacre (Lee 1981). In February 1981, 
Chun reassumed his seven year, one-term presidency through a new 
electoral college set up under the new constitution, and his Democratic 
Justice Party secured a simple majority in the National Assembly 
elections held in March that year (Suh 1982) . (See Table 1 for the 
election results.) 
In sum, from the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948 up 
to the early 1980s, there were two critical moments of regime transition 
from authoritarian rule towards competitive democracy, both triggered 
by instances of regime collapse: one following the student uprising in 
1960, and the other following the sudden death of Park Chung-hee in 
1979. Both chances for attaining democracy, however, were nullified by 
the intervention of the military, which had become an indispensable 
institution as a result of apparent external threats, exemplified by the 
Korean War. There are, nonetheless, two aspects that sharply differentiate 
the two cases of military intervention, in terms of processes. First, when 
staging the coups, Park overthrew a democratically established 
government, while Chun simply took over government in a power 
vacuum created by Park's assassination. Secondly, in projecting their 
rule, respectively, Park sought popular support through validation by 
electoral contest (although later Park also resorted to an indirect electoral 
method), whereas Chun made little effort to legitimate his leadership 
through popular elections. 'Even if he had' , Han Sung-joo argues, he 
'probably would not have succeeded' (Han 1974:283) . The society of 
the 1980s was substantially different from that of the 1960s, given the 
social and economic changes that had taken place,5 and had difficulty 
accepting 'the objective institutional needs' of the military (Graham 
1991). 
The 1985 National Assembly elections provided a test for the Chun 
government, which was scheduled to step down by February 1988. The 
newly-formed New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP), consisting mainly 
of once-banned opposition politicians, emerged as the number one 
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opposition party, in effect repudiating the opposition parties established 
in the early years of the Chun government and challenging the regime 
by its phenomenal success at the polls (Koh 1985; Kim 1986). In these 
elections, two thirds of the national-list seats, comprising of one third of 
the total Assembly seats, were to be allocated to the party which gained 
the biggest share of the contested seats, and the remaining one third was 
to be allocated to the other parties, in proportion to seats won. (For a 
detailed discussion on the allocation system of the national-list seats, see 
Yun 1985 and Kim 1993). (The election results are set out in Table 1.) 
Table 1: The National Assembly election results (1981-1985) (distribution of 
national-list seats shown in brackets) 
1981 1985 
1981 1985 
Partya Votes (%) Seats Votes (%) Seats 
DJP 35.6 90 (61) 35.3 87 (61) 
DKP 21.6 57 (24) 19.7 26 (9) 
KNP 13.3 18 (7) 9.2 15 (5) 
NKDP 29.3 50 ( 17) 
Minor Parties 18.8 8 3.3 2 
Independents 10.7 11 3.2 4 
Total 100.0 184 (92) 100.0 184 (92) 
aDJP - Democratic Justice Party; DKP - Democratic Korean Party; KNP - Korean 
National Party; NKDP - The New Korean Democratic Party. 
Source: Chungang-son' go-kwalli-wiwonhoe [Central Election Management 
Committee], Che 11 Dae Kukhoeuiwon Son'go Sanghwang [The I lth National 
Assembly Election Proceedings], 1981, and Che 12 Dae Kukhoeuiwon Son'go 
Ch'ongram [The 12th National Assembly Election Proceedings] 1985. 
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Soon after, the new opposition, which had absorbed most of the 
DKP' s parliamentary members after the election, led a campaign to 
revise the constitution to allow for direct election of the president. The 
campaign met with opposition from the ruling party, which ultimately 
decided to defend the existing constitution (deviating from its initial 
position, that if any revision had to be made, a parliamentary system of 
government was preferable). The ensuing deadlock led to civil unrest, 
which reached a peak in June 1987 but was finally resolved when Roh 
Tae-woo, the DJP' s presidential nominee designated by President Chun 
and a former member of the new military junta, acceded to the 
opposition's demands for restoring popular presidential elections, along 
with several other democratization measures. 6 
By 'convoking' direct presidential elections, the deadlock, which 
had compelled the government to choose between violent repression and 
co-optation, was quickly resolved. The process of democratic transition 
began with the emergence of a structured opposition demanding a more 
representative form of government and resulted in a 'reforma-pactada ', 
in which the rules of the authoritarian regime (the rules of electoral 
competition in particular) were abandoned, without immediately 
removing the incumbents from power. 7 
With the reemergence of the electoral process on the centre stage of 
politics, the democratization process proceeded to competition between 
parties seeking institutionalized support. As Colomer has noted, however, 
'electoral results tend to change the delimitation of the actors and 
formulate new relevant issues, so that the outcome obtained by way of 
interactions by agreement may then be more or less dramatically altered' 
(Colomer 1991: 1299). In the following two sections, the role played by 
political cleavages-old and new-in the 'founding' elections, and in the 
aftermath of those elections, will be discussed with particular attention to 
the implications for the party system and the future of Korean 
democracy. 
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Democratic founding elections and the voters 
The 'first post-authoritarian' elections in 1987 shared some of the 
characteristics of 'founding' elections suggested by O'Donne11 and 
Schmitter. 8 
Founding elections are . . .  moments of great drama. Turnout is very 
high. Parties advocating cancellation, postponement, or abstention are 
swept aside by the civic enthusiasm that attends such moments .... 
Moreover, founding elections seem to have a sort of freezing effect upon 
subsequent political developments. Where they are followed by 
successive iterations of the electoral process, few new parties get into 
the game, and many minor ones are likely to drop out (O'Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986:62). 
The voter turnout in the 1987 presidential election was the highest 
since the 1960s, reaching 89 .2 per cent, about 10 per cent higher than 
that of the previous (1971) presidential election (79.8 per cent).9 The 
extraordinarily high turnout of the 1985 National Assembly elections 
(84.6 per cent) may be said to have heralded that of 1987. 10 More 
importantly, however, the pattern of turnout deviated from those of the 
past, where the tojo eh 'on 'go (urban low/rural high) phenomenon had 
prevailed. I I For example, Seoul voters, who had been notorious for their 
low turnout previously, achieved a turnout of 88.l per cent, far above the 
197 1 record of 71.3 per cent.12 The voters also participated 
enthusiastically in the election campaign, which was restored after sixteen 
years of suspension: for example, on some occasions, each of the three 
main candidates-Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam, and Kim Dae-jung­
attracted over a million people to their election rallies (Chosun-ilbo-sa 
1988:25). 
The bases for electoral competition for the five-year, one-term 
limited presidency were, however, drawn largely from the past. That is, 
Roh Tae-woo of the ruling DJP was the successor to the Chun regime, 
thus representing the governing side of the authoritarian regimes of the 
past; Kim Y oung-sam of the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) and 
Kim Dae-jung of the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD), whose 
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Table 2: Regional vote distributions of the 1987 presidential election (and the 
1988 National Assembly election) (%) 
Candidate Roh Kim Kim Kim Other Total 
(Party)a Tae-woo Young-sam Dae-jung Jong-pil 
Region (DJP) (RDP) (PPD) (NDRP) 
Seoul 30.0 29.1 32.6 8.2 0.1 100.0 
(26.2) (23.4) (27.0) (16.1) (7.3 ) ( 100.0) 
Kyonggi 41.0 28.1 22.1 8.7 0.1 100.0 
I lnch'on (36.4) (24. l )  (15.5) (17.6) (6.4) ( 100.0) 
Kangwon 59.3 26. l 8.8 5.4 0.4 100.0 
(43.6) (21.6) (4.0) (20.2) (I 0.6) (I 00.0) 
North Ch' ungch' ong 46.9 28.2 11.0 13 .5 0.4 100.0 
(43.7) (16.0) (1.4) (3 3 .3 )  (5.6) (100.0) 
South Ch'ungch'ong 26.2 16. l 12.4 45.0 0.3 100.0 
I Taejon (30.2) (15.0) (3.8) (46.5) (4.5) ( 100.0) 
North Cholla 14. l 1.5 83.5 0.8 0.1 100.0 
(28.8) (1.3) (61.5) (2.5) (5.9) ( 100.0) 
South Cholla 7.3 1.0 91.3 0.3 0.1 100.0 
I Kwangju (19.5) (0.7) (73.6) (I. I) (5.1) ( 100.0) 
North Kyongsang 68. l 26.6 2.5 2.4 0.4 100.0 
/Taegu (49.9) (26.0) (0.8) (14.9) (8.4) ( 100.0) 
South Kyongsang 36.6 53.7 6.9 2.6 0.2 100.0 
I Pusan (36.1) (45.7) (1.5) (8.6) (8.1) (100.0) 
Cheju 49.8 26.8 18 . 6 4.5 0.3 100.0 
(36.0) (27 .1) (6.0) (3.4) (27 .5) (l 00.0) 
Total 36.6 28.0 27.1 8 .1 0.2 100.0 
(34.0) (23.8) (19.3) (15.6) (7.3) ( 100.0) 
aDJP - Democratic Justice Party; RDP - Reunification Democratic Party; PPD - Party for 
Peace and Democracy; NDRP - New Democratic Republican Party. 
Source: Chungang-son'go-kwalli-wiwonhoe [Central Election Management Committee]. 
Che 13 Dae Kukhoeuiwon Son'go Ch'ongram [Election Returns of the 13th National 
Assembly Election], 1988. 
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careers as freedom fighters went back to the era of the Park Chung-hee 
regime represented the opposition forces, even though they failed to 
agree upon a single candidacy. Kim Jong-pil of the New Democratic 
Republican Party (NDRP), a former prime minister under Park, and his 
party, revitalized from the defunct DRP ( 1963-80), joined the three-way 
race of Roh and the two Kims although he had little chance of winning 
since he represented the governing side from the rather remote past. No 
other parties representing new interests prospered in the competition, 
resulting in Roh and the three Kims polling a total of 99 .8 per cent of the 
formal votes (see Table 2 ). 
If there was a new factor in play (or more precisely, a revived one, as 
candidates in past presidential elections had also enjoyed 'home region 
advantages') it was the regional cleavages that the political actors actively 
sought to mobilize. By tapping their relative popularity in the regions 
where they had personal ties, the four candidates sought to secure their 
chances of winning in the simple plurality race of the 'three big and one 
small' . Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam, unable to compromise to 
form a unified democratic opposition, made strong appeals to the voters 
in the regions where they had ties- that is, in Cholla (and Kwangju) and 
South Kyongsang (and Pusan), respectively. This may have been an 
easier strategy for them than for the other candidates, because of their 
already established political renown. For Roh Tae-woo, a son of North 
Kyongsang (and Taegu), where Park Chung-bee had also been strong, a 
similar regional appeal may have posed few difficulties. The election 
campaign thus became increasingly regionalistic, and as the campaign 
became a race of regional appeal, Kim Jong-pil also began to solidify his 
regional basis in South Ch'ungch' ong (and Taejon). 
In this election, the regime successor, Roh, won the presidency with 
36.6 per cent of the votes (see Table 2). Rho's victory, however, was by 
no means a mandate for renewed authoritarianism. It was simply a case 
of the opposition forces failing to gain political power because of 
strategy errors and difficulties, especially insofar as they were badly 
divided. Equally, as Lee Man-woo put it, 'there was no particular reason 
why the achievement of democracy had to be equated with the victory of 
one of the two Kims' (Lee 1990:52). What marked this election was that 
the issue of regime legitimacy, which used to sharply divide the 
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opposition and the government, became increasingly less politically 
significant. The apparent inheritor of the legacy of Park' s and Chun' s 
authoritarian regimes, Roh Tae-woo was successful, at least partly, in 
turning aside the thorny issue of legitimacy both by actively promoting 
the stunning concessions of his June 29 declaration on democratization, 
while supporting political stability and continued economic growth, and 
by engaging in the emotion-charged regionalistic electoral contests 
pursued by his opponents. The critical decision of the two Kims to split 
at the precise moment of optimum opportunity for victory may have 
turned their positive public images as freedom fighters into those of self­
interested politicians. This made it even harder to put the issue of 
legitimacy-perhaps the only issue where the opposition had 
overwhelming appeal-at the forefront. 
Nonetheless, it was a combination of the old and the new cleavages 
that determined the individual voters' choices and ultimately the election 
outcomes. For some (and obviously a major portion of the voters), the 
regional cleavage, which became highly visible during the election 
campaign, was the most important ground for their decision. For others, 
judgments of past performance were still important. As a result, Roh won 
his victory on the support of the older and less educated segments of the 
voters, who could go along with the positive side of his past, and on his 
regional strongholds of North Kyongsang. Kim Young-sam and Kim 
Dae-jung shared the votes of the younger and the better educated, 13 who 
had long been societal bases of opposition, on top of the votes of their 
respective regional strongholds. The support of Kim Jong-pil was largely 
limited to his regional strongholds. The role played by the regional 
cleavage in this democratic 'founding' election was thus far-reaching, in 
that each of the candidates clearly dominated the others, rather than 
enjoying only relative advantage, in their respective regional strongholds. 
Aftermath of the founding elections: the voters and 
political actors 
The 1988 National Assembly election, held a few months after the 1987 
presidential election, was a first-past-the-post contest for the 224 
contested seats, and the outcome was a virtual replication of the 1987 
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result. 14 However the turnout was far lower, 75.8 per cent. Moreover, the 
forces of regional cleavage spilled-over into this election, on an even 
greater scale. This was particularly so for the PPD: all of its members in 
Cholla (North and South) and Kwangju-a special city in the Cholla 
region-were elected, but in other regions (except the neutral regions of 
Seoul and Kyonggi) none of its members was elected. Even its share of 
the votes was decimated, except in Seoul, where it was the strongest of all. 
In Kyonggi only one of its members was elected. In this regard, the other 
parties fared much the same, winning roughly 80 per cent of the seats in 
their respective regional strongholds. This pattern of region-party 
alliance was unprecedented. In past National Assembly elections the 
yoch 'on-yado (government rural/opposition urban) phenomenon had 
prevailed; the urban/rural cleavage exerted small but significant effects 
upon voting choice in the 1988 election. 
What was distinct in the 1988 election was that the ruling DJP failed 
to gain a simple majority although it won the biggest share of the 
National Assembly seats. It was the first time in the history of Korean 
electoral politics that the ruling party lost its majority status. Unlike the 
presidential elections, in which a pluralist winner takes all, the pluralist 
position of the DJP in the Assembly simply meant that the president and 
his government needed support from the opposition parties to ratify the 
executive' s programme. In previous assemblies this had been largely 
carried through by invoking the ruling party's dominant position. 
Notwithstanding the achievements of the yoso - yadae (small 
government party, big opposition) Assembly-exemplified by the 
assembly hearings on 'the Fifth Republic irregularities', including the 
1980 Kwangju massacre (Han 1989b; Lee 1990)-the situation lasted for 
less than two years, ending in January 1990 with the creation of the 
Democratic Liberal Party (DLP). The DLP was a grand alliance of parties 
from both sides of parliament, including the ruling DJP of Roh, the 
opposition RDP of Kim Young-sam, and the NDRP, led by Kim Jong-pil, 
which was generally considered to be the most likely to join with the 
ruling party (Park 1990; Lee 1990). The potentially dominant DLP 
emerged as a result of decisions in higher level political circles, which 
were obviously incongruent with the electoral verdict of the Korean 
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Table 3. Regional vote distributions of the 1992 presidential election (and the 1992 
National Assembly election) (%) 
Candidate Kim Kim Chung Other Total 
(Party)a Young-sam Dae-jung Ju-young 
Region (DLP) (DP) (UNP) 
Seoul 36.4 37.8 18.0 7.8 100.0 
(34.8) (37.3) (19.4) (8.5) (l 00.0) 
Kyonggi 36.6 31.9 22.7 8.8 100.0 
I Inch'on (36.5) (31.6) (19.9) (12.0) (100.0) 
Kangwon 41.5 15.5 34.1 8.9 I 00.0 
(38.7) (11. 7) (32.0) (17.6) (l 00.0) 
North Ch' ungch' ong 38.3 26.0 23.9 11. 8 100.0 
(44.3) (23.7) (21.8) ( l 0.2) (I 00.0) 
South Ch'ungch'ong 36.3 28.6 24.5 10.6 100.0 
I Taejon (37 .9) (22.0) (17.9) (22.2) ( 100.0) 
North Cholla 5.7 89.1 3.2 2.0 100.0 
(32.1) (54.8) (4.8) (8.3) (100.0) 
South Cholla 3.5 93.4 1.8 l. 3 100.0 
I Kwangju (20.1) (66.3) (4.7) (8.9) (I 00.0) 
North Kyongsang 62.5 8.9 17 .3 11.3 100.0 
/Taegu (48.2) (9.7) (21.2) (20.9) ( 100.0) 
South Kyongsang 72.8 10.9 8.9 7.4 100.0 
I Pusan (48.5) (14.0) (15.4) (22. 1) (100.0) 
Cheju 40.0 32.9 16.1 11.0 100.0 
(34.1) (19.9) ( - ) (46.0) ( 100.0) 
Total 42.0 33.8 16.3 7.9 100.0 
(38.5) (29.2) (17.4) (14.9) ( 100.0) 
aDLP - Democratic Liberal Party; DP - Democratic Party; UNP - Unification National Party. 
Source: Chungang'son'go-kwalli-wiwonhoe [Central Election Management Committee]. 
Che 14 Dae Kukhoeuiwon Song'go Ch'ongram [Election Returns of the 14 National 
Assembly Election], 1993. 
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voters who had 'refused to allow the emergence of a "too-strong" 
government' (Park 1990:1156). 
The voters' perception was thus at variance with the DLP view, that 
'the merger would bring political stability and economic growth to the 
nation, which had been afflicted by unrest and instability in the course of 
democratisation in recent years' (Lee 1990: 127). Later the same year, 
the party led by Kim Dae-jung (left alone in opposition) and the 'small' 
Democratic Party formed by a few of the former members of the RDP 
who declined to join the new ruling DLP were merged under the name 
the Democratic Party (DP). 
On the assumption that the 1987-1988 elections were fought on the 
basis of the two main electoral cleavages of region, and pro-government 
versus pro-democratic-reform, it seemed likely that the new ruling DLP 
would have a far more advantageous position in future electoral contests 
than its immediate predecessor, the DJP, not to mention its current 
competitor, the DP. That is, the DLP would have a wider regional basis as 
a result of the merger of the three parties with strong regional appeal, and 
it could also have been expected to broaden the societal basis of its 
support by the inclusion of Kim Y oung-sam and his party, who had 
shared the societal basis of the opposition. The electoral fortune of the 
DP may have lain in its advancing, as the sole opposition party, into the 
gaps in the societal basis of traditional opposition support which Kim 
Young-sam' s actions had created. In this way, it could have hoped to 
overcome its solid but numerically limited regional basis of electoral 
support. 
The outcomes of the National Assembly and subsequent presidential 
elections in April and December 1992, however, indicated that the DLP 
had only modest success in maintaining the widened regional basis, 
particularly in the regions where Roh and Kim Jong-pil had been strong, 
and virtually failed to broaden its societal basis of support (Bae 1 995:95-
101). Indeed, the DLP and Kim Young-sam won more support from 
those social segments which used to support the ruling parties, despite 
efforts to distance themselves from the outgoing government and 
notwithstanding Kim's background as a long-time opposition leader. As 
expected, Kim Y oung-sam and his DLP performed best in his regional 
strongholds. Kim Dae-jung and his DP again failed to gain substantial 
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support beyond his regional strongholds (including Seoul); this was 
reflected in the modest support he got from former opposition 
supporters. The newcomer Chung Ju-young, former chairman of the 
Hyundai conglomerate, and his Unification National Party (UNP) reaped 
the biggest reward, attracting the floating or cross-pressured voters from 
both opposition and government sides. He also had some success in 
Kangwon, where Chung claimed personal regional ties, and where the 
ruling parties' dominance had previously been assured. Overall, the DLP 
secured government by winning the assembly majority, albeit by a small 
margin, and by having its presidential candidate elected. The turnout in 
the Assembly election, at 71.9 per cent, was the lowest ever, while the 
81.9 per cent turnout in the presidential election was also well down on 
that of 1987. 
The single most important variable shaping the voters' choice in the 
1992 elections appears to have been the regional factor, and not a pro­
government versus pro-democratic political alignment. This suggests that 
the DLP merger, despite its rhetoric, was nothing more than a grand 
regional coalition. In this sense, the parties in the opposition were no 
exception: their sustained existence may have owed much more to their 
ability to occupy a geographical space than to their pro-democratic (or 
liberal) political stance. 
Regionalism and presidentialism: towards coalition politics? 
Few would dispute the importance of regionalism in voting behaviour in 
Korean electoral politics since 1987. Given the limited ideological space 
(and general conservatism) in Korean politics, no party of significance 
had either the mandate or the capability to make a specific class appeal. 
This may have left the regional cleavage-always a latent resource for 
political exploitation despite its subtlety in a society relatively 
homogeneous in race, language and culture-as a critical source of 
partisan mobilization in a period of electoral uncertainty. Having 
assumed a central place, the regional cleavage continues to prevail in 
electoral contests, and the region-party alliance has become an enduring 
pattern. 
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So far, the region-party alliance, crafted on the basis of the regional 
traits of party leaders and voters, seems to have promoted electoral 
stability rather than volatility. This was particularly so for the voters of 
Cholla and Kyongsang, known for their regional rivalry, as each region 
produced viable presidential candidates in both the 1987 and 1992 
elections.15 
However, this seemingly 'frozen' pattern of region-party alliance, 
which has yielded electoral stability, may yet give way to two potential 
sources of volatility. First, given that regionalism was expressed through 
voters' evaluations of political leaders, it is likely that sudden changes in 
party leadership will result in a redistribution of partisan support in a 
relatively short period. Considering the current electoral arrangement, in 
which the presidential term is fixed for five years, the potential for 
electoral volatility seems to be increasing. That is, as a change of 
leadership is predicated within the presidential term, it is likely that a 
redistribution of partisan support will occur along regional lines within 
that term, unless the incoming party leader shares regional traits with the 
outgoing one. Secondly, once mobilized as a source of political support, 
the forces of regionalism are likely to retain a central place in political 
contests, which were formerly highly personalized. As voters are 
regionally conscious and increasingly view party politics as a regional 
contest, it is likely that regional voting will spill over to regions which 
formerly showed little tendency towards regional voting if they are 
provided with a viable candidate. Consequently the unit of region-party 
alliance could reduce in size, from the region to the administrative 
province, providing a favourable environment for a burgeoning of minor 
parties with claims on regional interests. The relative success of the UNP 
in 1992 (and the NDRP in 1988) may have been partly due to the fact 
that they could draw solid support from their home regions and a small 
but significant degree of support from other 'neutral' regions. 
The latter aspect deserves more attention in relation to Korea' s 
presidential system of government. The pattern of region-party alliance, 
as the regional cleavage looms larger, has a centrifugal tendency that 
could result in a multi-party system. The relative success of Kim Jong-pil 
and his NDRP in 1987 and 1988, and Chung Ju-young and his UNP in 
1992, cannot be fully understood without referring to the ever-increasing 
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regionalistic nature of the Korean electoral contests. A multi-party 
electoral contest may be unlikely to produce a simple majority for any 
party, as the election outcomes since 1987 have shown, thus imposing a 
limit upon the ability of the president (who may have received far less 
than a simple majority vote) to claim a popular mandate, and inviting 
executive/legislative deadlock whenever the ruling party fails to garner a 
majority in the Assembly. In such cases, as Mainwaring argues, 
.. .immobilism and sharp conflict between the executive and the 
legislature, with potentially deleterious consequences for democratic 
stability and/or effective governance, often result .... If, in addition to 
being highly fragmented, the party system is also polarised, the 
difficulties of governing will be compounded' (Mainwaring 1993:2 15-
216). 
The experiment of the DLP coalition, which arbitrarily reshaped the 
four-party system (or more precisely the three-and-a-half system) into a 
two-party system so as to overcome the difficulties of governing as well 
as to project its rule by electoral means, seems to have achieved the 
DLP' s immediate goals. That is, with nearly two thirds of members in the 
Assembly, the DLP successfully supported the Roh government in its last 
year, achieving a simple majority in the new Assembly (though its 
strength was below that in the previous Assembly) as well as electing its 
presidential candidate. Fortunately for the new 'civilian' government of 
Kim Young-sam, it commands a majority in the National Assembly, 
maintained on the one hand by recruiting new members and on the other 
by selectively curtailing potential splintering within the DLP through its 
popular clean-up campaign, enabling it to implement somewhat 
aggressive reform measures.16 
However, the basis of the DLP coalition is by no means solid. As an 
odd merger of the former ruling elements (the DJP and the NDRP) and 
Kim' s formerly opposition followers, the common and perhaps only 
interests to keep the coalition together may have been their reluctance 'to 
see the PPD led by Kim Dae Jung monopolise power through direct 
presidential elections' (Park 1990: 1 158). Once past election day, 
difficulties inevitably arose in keeping the coalition partners together.1 7 
Apart from the lack of a power-sharing mechanism against presidential 
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autonomy, 18 regionalism may provide a major incentive for the coalition 
partners to break up. The fact that the DLP failed to fill the three vacant 
assembly seats of Taegu/Kyongbuk, regional strongholds of the former 
DJP, in by-elections held in August 1993 and August 1994, may 
contribute to this tendency unless new incentives for keeping the 
coalition together are provided for President Kim's coalition partners. In 
the face of the 1995 local elections, in which the heads of the fifteen 
provinces and special cities were popularly elected, and elections for the 
local assembly and heads of the lower-level autonomous bodies, Kim 
Jong-pil' s faction broke with the ruling DLP. His new party (United 
Liberal Democrats) was successful in electing the four heads of provinces 
and special cities-three in his regional strongholds (North 
Ch' ungch' ong, South Ch' ungch' ong and Taejon) and one in 
Kangwon.19 
With the 1996 National Assembly elections approaching, the party 
system underwent a notable change. The ruling DLP changed its name to 
the New Korea Party (NKP), and Kim Dae-jung, who announced his 
retirement from politics just after the 1992 presidential election, returned 
to the political arena, forming the National Congress for New Politics 
(NCNP) by breaking from the then main opposition DP. The contest, 
which was fought by the four major parties, ended up as a regional one: 
the NKP dominant in Pusan and Kyongnam, the NCNP in Cholla, and 
Kim Jong-pil's ULD in Ch' ungch'ong. The DP, which had no regional 
strongholds, became a minor party of fifteen legislative members. The 
ruling NKP again failed to secure half the seats, winning 121 out of the 
253 seats contested. 
The forthcoming presidential election of December 1997 may be 
fought along the regional multi-party lines produced by the previous 
election. New participants, who may make regional appeals, are expected 
to proliferate, and no participant is expected to gamer a simple majority 
of the votes. This may again necessitate coalition-building if the Korean 
presidential system of government continues to prosper, as the 
presidential system is more likely to be compatible with a two-party 
contest (Mainwaring 1993: 200).  Indeed, the presidential system 
facilitated the survival of the two-party system in Korea due to 'the 
proclivity of the politicians to gather around two major parties-one for 
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and the other against government' (Han 1989a:296). However, this 
means that the Korean party system may have to perpetuate a vicious 
cycle of fragmentation and coalition-building dependent on the leaders' 
regional traits. 
A coalition based on regional cleavage may prove unstable because 
of its centrifugal tendency, but if it results in significant regional 
minorities being permanently excluded from power it will also endanger 
competition by rendering it a merely formal and empty process · 
(Mainwaring 1993:223). Notwithstanding the point made by Kim and 
Koh over two decades ago, that 'in a society that is otherwise 
homogeneous, regional pride and identity may provide necessary 
safeguards against growing mobilisation by the centralized government, 
and against the possible dangers of totalitarian manipulation of the 
masses' (Kim and Koh 1972:854), highly personalized and emotion­
charged regionalism hinders, in the long-run, the formation of a more 
responsive political system. 
Given the ideological Left-Right rigidity of the society, the 
conversion of the old pro-government versus pro-democratic cleavage 
into a conservative/liberal division20 and the establishment of this division 
as a central part of electoral competition, may be a viable option in the 
future. The strengthening of this line of cleavage may also counteract the 
forces of regional sentiment in electoral choice. 
* 
Notes 
This paper is a revised version of Chapter 7 of the author's thesis submitted for 
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Australian National University, 
'Korean Elections and Voters in the Transition to Democracy' ( 1995). The 
author wishes to thank his PhD supervisory panel, Dr Clive Bean, Prof. James 
Cotton, Dr Ken Wells, and Mr Ian F.K. Wilson. 
For a review of the process of transplanting democratic institutions during the 
period 1945-48, see Oh Byung-hun ( 1967) and Gordenker ( 1958). 
17 
2 For a discussion on the historical significance of Unified Silla, whose territory 
and people formed the mainstream of subsequent Korean history, see Eckert et 
al. ( 1990:42-44). See also Lee ( 1993). 
3 A minimal or 'realistic' definition of democracy was given by Schumpeter: 'the 
democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political 
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a 
competitive struggle for the people's vote' in such a way that 'the reins of 
government should be handed to those who command more support than do any 
of the competing individuals or teams' (Schumpeter 1976:269, 273). Dahl also 
defined political democracy as a system in which the public is 'entitled to 
participate on a more or less equal plane in controlling and contesting the 
conduct of government: to participate, so to speak, in the system of public 
contestation' (Dahl 197 1:4). In a democracy, as Przeworski put it, 'no one can 
win once for all: even if successful at one time, victors immediately face the 
prospect of having to struggle in the future' (Przeworski 1986:57); Przeworski 
described democratization as 'a process of institutionalising uncertainty' 
(ibid.:58). Huntington (1991), with a procedural definition of democracy, went 
on to argue that 'the sustained failure of the major opposition political party to 
win office necessarily raises questions concerning the degree of competition 
permitted by the system', given that 'the central procedure of democracy is the 
selection of leaders through competitive elections by the people they govern' 
(ibid.:8, 6). Also see Storm (1992). For a historical review of Korean democratic 
experiments see Han (1989a) and Park (1987). 
4 Under the Yushin (revitalising reform) Constitution, which was adopted by a 
national referundum allegedly to promote national unification and effective 
socioeconomic development in the changing international situation, the 
president was to be indirectly elected by an easily manipulable electoral college, 
without restrictions on the presidential term. The fixed-term presidency used to 
be a major legal obstacle to prolonging one-man rule, and thus became a main 
source of constitutional amendment. The president also appointed one third of 
the National Assembly members (see Kim 1974). For a discussion of the 
Yushin system see Lee (1990). 
5 From the early 1960s South Korean society went through a process of 
modernization. Some indicators are given in Appendix 1. 
6 For a discussion of the events leading up to the June 29 declaration, see Lee 
(1990), Cotton (1989) and West and Baker ( 1988). 
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7 For an application of O'Donnell and Schmitter' s model of democratic transition 
to Korea, see Im (1990). Also see O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Linz (1990), 
and Colomer ( 1991 ). 
8 The term 'first postauthoritarian elections' used by Turner (l 993) is 
interchangeable with 'founding elections'. The term 'transition elections', 'the 
first national electoral contests which follow the restoration of political 
freedoms', used by Bermeo (1987), is also similar to 'founding elections'. But 
writing in the East European context, Bogdanor (1990) cautioned that 'it is 
probably not until there have been at least two further free elections held under 
normal conditions that one will be in a position to make meaningful 
generalisations about the electoral process'. It seems logical to expect more 
uncertainty, or to emphasise the transitional nature of the elections, in regimes 
that have experienced sudden collapse. 
9 See Chungang-son'go Ch'ongram [Central Election Management Committee], 
Che 13 Dae Taet'ongryong Son'go Ch'ongram [The 13th Presidential Election 
Proceedings], Seoul: 1987; and Taehanmin 'guk Son 'go Sa [Election History of 
the Republic of Korea], Vol 1, 1973. 
10 See Chungang-son 'go-kwalli-wiwonhoe [Central Election Management 
Committee], Che 12 Dae Kukhoeuiwon Son'go Ch'ongram [The 12th National 
Assembly Election Proceedings], Seoul, 1985. 
11 The tojo ch'on'go (urban-low, rural-high) phenomenon is a description of the 
observed tendency that voting rates are higher in the rural areas, where the voters 
are more prone to mobilization by the government's administrative networks 
than their metropolitan counterparts. See Mo, Brady and Ro ( 1991) and Kim 
(1980). 
12 The Seoul voters' turnout was once again lower (by 6.5 per cent) than the 
national turnout (75.8 per cent) in the 1988 National Assembly election, but in 
the 1992 National Assembly election (a gap of 2.7 per cent) and the 1992 
presidential election (a gap of 0.5 per cent) there is no such clear tendency. 
1 3 An empirical study shows that the two Kims shared a similar pattern of societal 
support, which neatly counter-balanced the societal support for Roh Tae-woo, 
once the effects of regional voting were taken into account (see Bae 1995: 107-
144). 
14 There were also 75 uncontested (national-list) seats, making a total of 299 seats 
to be allocated in proportion to the seats (not the votes) gained by each party. 
The revision of the election law in 1994 provided that the national-list seats, 
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constituting one-third of the total, would be allocated in proportion to the votes 
gained by each party. See Table 2 for the election outcomes. 
15 In 1987, there were two candidates in Kyongsang: in the North, Roh Tae-woo, 
and in the South, Kim Young-sam; but in 1992 Kim Young-sam was the only 
viable candidate in the region, gaining the support in the North that Roh had 
once enjoyed. 
16 For a discussion of the new government's reforms, see Lee and Sohn (1994). 
1 7 Mainwaring (1993:220-222) points to three factors which pose difficulties in 
building a stable coalition in presidential systems in comparison to 
parliamentary systems: lack of a binding mechanism in the post-election period 
(coalition formation generally taking place before the election), given the 
autonomous executive power; weaker commitments by individual legislators to 
toe the party line; and electoral incentives of parties to break coalitions, as some 
remain silent partners in the coalition without enjoying the benefits. 
18 Exemplified by the purges of leading figures of former regimes, inevitably 
involving many politicians from Taegu/Kyongbuk, in the course of Kim's ever 
popular anti-corruption drive. 
19 In this local election, held on 27 June 1995, each of the parties had some 
success in every party's regional stronghold: the ruling OLP won 5 out of 15 
heads of the provinces and special cities, in South Kyongsang, Pusan, North 
Kyongsang, Kyonggi and Inch'on; the main opposition, DP won four in Seoul, 
North Cholla, South Cholla and Kwangju; and the Independents, won two in 
Cheju and Tae-gu. See Chungang son'go-kwalli'wiwonhoe [Central Election 
Management Committee]. Chon 'guk Tongshi Chibang Son 'go Ch 'ongram [The 
Local Election Proceedings], 1995. 
20 A similar point was made by Lee Kap-yun in forecasting the political 
configuration of partisan alignment soon after the 1985 National Assembly 
election (see Lee 1986:163). 
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Appendix I 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
Total pop. in millions (3) 25.0 29.2b 31.5 34.7 37.4 40.4 43.5 
Urban pop. as % of total (3) 28.0 33.6b 43.2 48.4 57.3 65.4 74.4 
Av. annual growth rate of GDP 
1960-70, 1970-80 & 1980-90(2) 8.6 9.6 9.7 
Distribution of GDP(%) (4) 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 38.2 41.3 29.7 27.0 17.8 12.8 9.1 
Industry 18.6 23.9 27.2 31.3 37.9 41.8 44.8 
Service, etc. 43.2 35.8 43.l 41.7 44.3 45.4 46.1 
GNP per capita (US dollars) (4) 82a 114 223 574 1418 2194 5569 
Adult illiteracy ratio(%, age 15+) 
(1) & (2) 29.4 31.9 12.4 9.0 7.0 n.a. 4.0 
Gross enrolment ratio by 
age group (%) (1) 
Primary School 96.0 100.0 103.0 107.0 109.0 97.0 108.0 
Secondary School 27.0 34.0 42.0 56.0 80.0 90.0 87.0 
Post-Secondary School 4.7 6.2 7.9 9.6 14.1 34.2 39.2 
Distribution of adult population 
by education (%,Age 25+) (1) 
No Schooling 56.9 43.6 34.4 25.3 19.8 14.4 11.0c 
Primary School 29.6 35.2 38.2 39.3 34.6 28.l 21.7c 
Secondary School 10.9 17.5 21.8 28.7 37.0 46.5 51.3c 
Post-secondary School 2.6 3.6 5.6 6.7 8.6 l l.O 16.0c 
a - 1961 
b - 1966 
c - Calculated from the 1990 Census 
Sources: (1) UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1965. 1974, 1976. 1982. 1992: (2) World Bank. World 
Development Report, 1983, 1984, 1989, 1992, 1993; (3) Economic Planning Board, Population and 
Housing Census Report, 1960, 1966, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990; (4.) Korean Statistical Association. 
Korea Statistical Yearbook, 1966, 1971, 1982, 1991. 
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